Thursday, August 25, 2005

I read an interesting article by neocon Tod Lindberg yesterday about how the foreign policy aspect of Neoconservatism is actually a logical/realist extension of post-WWII Liberalism. The main thrust of the article was that Neoconservatism takes into account the "reality on the ground" while advancing the cause of "liberty", whereas the Liberalism of the '50's and 60's propounded a more universal applicability. Now I'm cautious about sounding the death knell in Iraq this early, but it seems like things are going completely to shit there as of late, and it's largely because of the sectarian/religious realities "on the ground" that the Neoconservative architects of the war either never took into account or ignored entirely for one reason or another. So if this "rigorous and realist case analysis" of the advancement of liberty is a central tenet of Neoconservatism, how did they get Iraq so wrong? How did they botch what they hail as a central tenet of the Neoconvervative foreign policy? I'm guessing it's just an utter and complete incomprehension of Iraqi society/internal politics, coupled with a gradual reconstruction of reality on their part via theoretical geopolitics, Iraqi dissident groups, securing oil insterests, and residual 9/11 vengenance. The upshot was that this original, geopolitically calculating version of Neoconservatism that Lindberg describes yielded to a more militant, post-Sept. 11 crusading neoconservatism that is both misguided and dangerous to the security of our country.


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